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CASTING A WIDER NET: ADDRESSING THE 
MARITIME PIRACY PROBLEM IN 
SOUTHEAST ASIA 
Erik Barrios*
Abstract: Because of the damage that maritime piracy inºicts on inter-
national trade and general safety, it has long been treated as a universal 
crime whose perpetrators were subject to punishment by any country that 
caught them. Piracy remains a serious threat to the international commu-
nity in modern times, especially in Southeast Asia. Roughly 45% of the 
world’s commercial shipping passes through Southeast Asia, so the mari-
time attacks in this region cause billions of dollars in economic loss each 
year. These attacks have attracted additional attention due to the fact that 
they are now being committed by terrorists as well as traditional maritime 
bandits. This Note discusses the basis for punishing these attacks under 
international law, and considers whether the deªnition of piracy under 
international law can encompass these attacks. 
Introduction 
 Piracy has posed a threat to all states’ maritime interests for 
nearly as long as people have sailed the oceans.1 States have long rec-
ognized the threat that piracy poses to political and commercial in-
terests, as well as to human safety.2 Since pirates operate on the seas, 
the “great highway of all maritime nations,” and since piracy can in-
ºict harm upon all states, international law treats piracy as a universal 
crime whose perpetrators are subject to punishment by any state that 
apprehends them.3
                                                                                                                      
* Erik Barrios is an Articles Editor of the Boston College International & Comparative Law 
Review. 
1 See generally Alfred P. Rubin, The Law of Piracy 8 (Naval War College Press 1988) 
(discussing the ancient Roman belief in the “impropriety” of piracy and the threat that 
piracy might pose to the “new commercial and political order that could not countenance 
interference with trade in the Mediterranean Sea”). 
2 See Delphine Soulas, Poverty Stirs Turbulence in Asian Waters; Attacks on Ships Triple Since 
’93, Wash. Times, Oct. 10, 2003, at A17, at 2003 WL 7720673. 
3 See Annual Digest of Public International Law Cases: Years 1919–1922, at 165 
(Sir John Fisher Williams & H. Lauterpacht eds., 1932); Paul Arnel, International Criminal 
Law and Universal Jurisdiction, 11 Int’l Legal Persp. 53, 60 (1999). 
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 Piracy remains a serious threat to international commerce and 
safety in modern times, especially in Southeast Asia.4 Commercial 
ships in this region have always been particularly vulnerable to the 
maritime attacks that characterize piracy due to the narrow waterways 
and countless small islands that deªne the region’s geography.5 Nev-
ertheless, there was a sharp increase in these attacks in the late 1990s 
following the massive unemployment and political instability caused 
by the Asian economic crisis.6 Indeed, in 2002, Southeast Asian waters 
played host to approximately 140 attacks.7
 The explosion of maritime violence in Southeast Asia is reason 
for serious international concern given the region’s signiªcant role in 
international commerce.8 Roughly 45% of the world’s commercial 
shipping moves through the region’s waters, and the frequent attacks 
on commercial vessels passing through the region can hamper inter-
national trade and lead to severe economic loss.9 Indeed, maritime 
attacks in the region have caused an estimated $16 billion in eco-
nomic loss over the past ªve years.10
 In addition, the possible links between the maritime attacks, local 
dissident groups, and terrorist groups such as al Qaeda justiªes in-
creased international attention.11 While violent dissident groups have 
                                                                                                                      
4 See generally Peter Chalk, “Threats to the Maritime Environment: Piracy and Terrorism” Pres-
entation at the RAND Stakeholder Consultation (Oct. 28–30, 2002) (noting the marked 
increase in piracy since the end of the Cold War, particularly in Southeast Asia); Pirates In 
Asia a Growing Threat to Global Trade, Heritage Foundation, June 23, 2000, at http:// 
www.heritage.org/Press/NewsReleases/NR062300.cfm (last visited Nov. 20, 2004) (describ-
ing attacks to commercial shipping in Southeast Asia); Sonia Kolesnikov, Piracy Still Rising, 
United Press Int’l, Apr. 20, 2002, available at LEXIS, News Library (reporting on the con-
tinuing rise in the incidents of piracy in Southeast Asia). 
5 See Ger Teitler, Piracy in Southeast Asia: A Historical Comparison, 1 Mast 1, 72 (2002), 
available at http://www.marecentre.nl/mast/documents/GerTeitler.pdf (last visited Nov. 
20, 2004). 
6 Dana Robert Dillon, Piracy in Asia: A Growing Barrier to Maritime Trade, Heritage Foun-
dation, Heritage Foundation, June 22, 2000, at http://www.heritage.org/Research/Asia 
andthePaciªc/BG1379.cfm (last visited Nov. 20, 2004). 
7 See, e.g., International Maritime Organization, Reports on Acts of Piracy and 
Armed Robbery Against Ships: Annual Report 2002, MSC.4/Circ. 32, April 17, 2003, at 
http://www.imo.org/includes/blastDataOnly.asp/data_id%3D7215/32-b&w.pdf (last vis-
ited Nov. 20, 2004). 
8 See Heritage Foundation, supra note 4. 
9 See id. 
10 John J. Brandon, Piracy as Terrorism, J. Com., June 3, 2003, at http://www.uscib.org/ 
index.asp?documentID=2153 (last visited Nov. 20, 2004). 
11 See Richard Halloran, What if Asia’s Pirates and Terrorists Joined Hands?, South China 
Morning Post (Hong Kong), May 17, 2003, available at http://www.uscib.org/index.asp 
?documentID=2636 (last visited Nov. 20, 2004); See also Is Terrorism Heading for the High 
Seas?, Yomiuri Shimbun/Daily Yomiuri, October 6, 2003, A11, at 2003 WL 5140196. 
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existed in the region for centuries, the attacks of September 11, 2001 
and the subsequent war on terrorism have focused increased atten-
tion upon possible links between al Qaeda and dissident groups in 
countries such as the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, and 
Thailand.12 Ofªcials in Southeast Asia worry about the increased fre-
quency with which these dissident groups have attacked maritime tar-
gets.13 Indeed, the International Maritime Bureau (IMB), an organi-
zation of the International Chamber of Commerce that tracks 
incidents of maritime crime throughout the world, reports the emer-
gence in Southeast Asia of a “new brand of piracy” in which the at-
tacks are motivated by political agendas rather than a traditional mo-
tive to rob.14 These attacks are consistent with the theory that 
terrorists in Southeast Asia have shifted strategies to encompass eco-
nomic, as well as political and military, targets.15 Actual attacks by ter-
rorists have thus far been limited to temporary seizures of vessels and 
crewmen, but ofªcials express concern over the ease with which large 
vessels such as oil tankers could be hijacked and used as weapons with 
which to block commercial waterways or attack one of Southeast 
Asia’s numerous busy harbors.16 In addition to direct attacks, terror-
ists may also exploit the region’s maritime shipping activity to facili-
tate their operations in other parts of the world.17 For example, au-
thorities suspect that terrorist groups have been using container ships 
to smuggle weapons, supplies, and even the terrorists themselves.18
 Thus, in addition to the usual concern over the threat to interna-
tional commerce, apprehension about the possible connection be-
tween pirates and terrorists also draws attention to the problem of 
piracy in Southeast Asia.19 These magniªed concerns highlight the 
                                                                                                                      
12 See James Gomez, September 11: Asian Perspectives, 13 Ind. Int’l Comp. L. Rev. 705, 
707 (2003). 
13 See Halloran, supra note 11; Yomiuri, supra note 11. 
14 New Brand of Piracy Threatens Oil Tankers in Malacca Straits, Icc Commercial Crime 
Services, Sept. 2, 2003, at http://www.iccwbo.org/ccs/news_archives/2003/piracy_ms.asp 
(last visited Nov. 20, 2004) [hereinafter New Brand of Piracy]. 
15 Graham Gerard Ong, Pre-empting Maritime Terrorism in Southeast Asia, Inst. of South 
East Asian Studies Viewpoints, Nov. 29, 2002, at www.iseas.edu.sg/viewpoint/ggonov02. 
pdf (last visited Nov. 20, 2004). 
16 See Peril on the Sea, Economist, Oct. 4, 2003, at 5; Adam J. Young & Mark J. Valencia, 
Conºation of Piracy and Terrorism in Southeast Asia: Rectitude & Utility, 25 Contemp. Southeast 
Asia 1, 32 (2003), at 2003 WL 5140196; Yomiuri, supra note 11 (discussing a tanker carrying 
liqueªed petroleum gas as the “likeliest terrorist target”). 
17 See Yomiuri, supra note 11 (describing anxieties about terrorists using container 
ships to smuggle people and explosives around the world). 
18 Id. 
19 See id. 
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need for more effective maritime law enforcement in the region, and 
have led scholars to examine the legal issues that may frustrate efforts 
to address these maritime attacks.20
 This Note discusses the basis under international law for punish-
ing the maritime attacks in Southeast Asia, and considers whether the 
deªnition of piracy under customary international law encompasses 
these attacks. Part II of this Note outlines the current state of interna-
tional law on piracy and other forms of maritime violence. This sec-
tion also discusses the deªnition of piracy  in the United Nations Con-
vention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS); perhaps the most widely 
known deªnition of piracy in international law. This section further 
describes the Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts 
Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (referred to herein as the 
“Rome Convention”), which addresses forms of maritime violence 
that are not encompassed by the UNCLOS deªnition. Part III dis-
cusses the shortcomings of UNCLOS and the Rome Convention when 
they are applied to the acts of maritime violence in Southeast Asia. 
Finally, Part IV examines possible solutions to these shortcomings. 
Part IV presents solutions proposed by scholars, discusses weaknesses 
in these proposals, and suggests a more readily applicable legal per-
spective to the Southeast Asian context. 
I. A Brief History of International Law Regarding Piracy and 
Maritime Violence 
 Piracy became a crime under international law as seafaring be-
came prevalent and international trade became a major part of all 
states’ economies.21 Early on, states recognized that piracy posed a 
threat to trade and the orderly functioning of the international com-
munity in general.22 Thus, the international community branded pi-
rates as hostes humani generis or enemies of the human race, and 
treated piracy as one of the few crimes over which universal jurisdic-
tion applied.23 As such, piracy remains punishable by all nations, 
                                                                                                                      
20 See, e.g., Tina Garmon, International Law of the Sea: Reconciling the Law of Piracy and 
Terrorism in the Wake of September 11, 27 Tul. Mar. L.J. 257, 259 (2002) (noting that recon-
cililing notions of piracy and terrorism under the law of the sea is inevitible as maritime 
violence and threats of terrorism increase). 
21 Id. at 259–60. 
22 See id. 
23 Williams & Lauterpacht, supra note 3, at 165. 
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wherever the perpetrators were found and without regard to where 
the offense occurred.24
 For centuries the international prohibition on piracy existed in 
varying deªnitions, but it was not until the international community 
adopted the Geneva Convention of the High Seas in 1958 that a 
deªnition was set forth in a major international instrument.25 UN-
CLOS, which was signed in 1982 and entered into force in 1994, iden-
tically restates the deªnition established in the Convention on the 
High Seas.26 According to the deªnition found in the Convention on 
the High Seas and UNCLOS, “piracy” consists of (1) illegal acts com-
mitted on the high seas (2) for private ends (3) by the crew or pas-
sengers of one ship against the crew, passengers, or property onboard 
another ship.27 The requirement that the acts be motivated for private 
ends restricts this deªnition to attacks committed with the intent to 
rob, and also limits the ability of states to claim universal jurisdiction 
over politically motivated attacks.28 This requirement reºects the 
states’ primary underlying concern about interference with commer-
cial shipping and transportation, and underscores the states’ general 
unwillingness to assert jurisdiction over politically motivated acts that 
do not have a commercial aspect.29 To date, Indonesia, Malaysia, and 
the Philippines, the states most heavily impacted by piracy, are parties 
to UNCLOS and as such are bound by the rights and obligations of 
the UNCLOS deªnition of piracy.30 Many writers treat UNCLOS as a 
codiªcation of the customary international law on piracy and con-
sider all states, whether parties or not, as bound by the UNCLOS 
deªnition.31
                                                                                                                      
24 See id. 
25 See Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29 1958, art. 15, 450 U.N.T.S. 11, available at 
http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/hseas.htm (last visited Nov. 20, 2004) [hereinafter High 
Seas Convention]; Garmon, supra note 20, at 259–63 (discussing the varied applications of 
piracy law under customary international law and the eventual adoption of the Conven-
tion on the High Seas which sought to provide a standard deªnition of piracy). 
26 See High Seas Convention, supra note 25, art. 15; United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, art. 101, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3, 436 [hereinafter UNCLOS]. 
27 UNCLOS, supra note 26, art. 101. 
28 Garmon, supra note 20, at 265. 
29 See id. 
30 See UN Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Chronological 
Lists of Ratiªcations of, accessions and successions to the Convention as at 1 
Nov. 2004, at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/reference_ªles/chronological_lists_of_rati 
ªcations.htm (last visited Nov. 20, 2004). 
31 See Garmon, supra note 20, at 275 (suggesting that the law contained in UNCLOS 
would apply to non-signatories as well). 
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 Soon after UNCLOS was adopted, it became clear that its con-
ception of piracy did not cover many of the violent crimes committed 
on the seas.32 On October 7, 1985, four armed stowaways onboard the 
Italian cruise liner Achille Lauro, hijacked the ship and killed one 
American passenger.33 The apparent political motivations for the at-
tack, the location of the attack in Egyptian waters, and the fact that 
the attack originated from the target ship rather than from a separate 
ship, placed the attack outside the UNCLOS deªnition of piracy and, 
presumably, beyond the purview of universal jurisdiction.34 The 
United States, and other states that may have had an interest in prose-
cuting the attackers, were apparently left without the authority under 
international law to do so.35
 After the Achille Lauro attack, the international community, 
through the UN and its International Maritime Organization (IMO), 
promulgated the Rome Convention, which established a legal basis 
for prosecuting maritime violence that did not fall within the UN-
CLOS piracy framework.36 The Rome Convention made it unlawful to 
seize or take control of a ship by force or the threat force, to perform 
an act of violence against a person on board a ship if it is likely to en-
danger safe navigation of that ship, to destroy or damage a ship or its 
cargo if it is likely to endanger safe navigation, to place devices or sub-
stances on a ship that are likely to destroy that ship, to knowingly 
communicate false information to a ship that would endanger safe 
navigation, and to injure or kill any person in connection with any of 
the above acts.37 The Rome Convention authorizes and, under certain 
circumstances, requires party states to establish jurisdiction over the 
perpetrators, either extraditing the perpetrators to another interested 
signatory state or prosecuting the alleged offenders themselves.38 The 
state of which the perpetrator is a national, the state in whose territo-
rial waters the act is committed, and the ºag state of the ship against 
whom the act is committed are all required to take measures neces-
                                                                                                                      
32 See id. at 271–72; Malvina Halberstam, Terrorism on the High Seas: The Achille Lauro, Pi-
racy and the IMO Convention on Maritime Safety, 82 Am. J. Int’l. L. 269, 285 (1998). 
33 Halberstam, supra note 32, at 269. 
34 See, e.g., UNCLOS, supra note 26, art. 101. 
35 See id. 
36 See Halberstam, supra note 32, at 295. 
37 Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime 
Navigation, Mar. 10, 1988, art. 3, 1678 U.N.T.S. 221, at http://www.unodc.org/unodc/ 
terrorism_convention_maritime_navigation.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2004) [hereinafter 
Rome Convention]. 
38 Id. arts. 6, 10(1); Halberstam, supra note 32, at 295–96. 
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sary to establish jurisdiction over the offenses.39 Furthermore, a party 
state is permitted to exercise jurisdiction if the victim is a national of 
the state, if the perpetrator’s habitual residence is in the state, or if 
the act was committed in an attempt to compel the state to do, or ab-
stain from doing, any act.40
 To date, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines, the states with 
the largest maritime presence and with the greatest potential to be 
affected by incidents of maritime violence covered by the Rome Con-
vention, have neither ratiªed, nor even signed it.41 Unlike UNCLOS, 
there is no assumption that non-signatories would be bound by the 
terms of the Rome Convention; it is clearly not a reºection or 
codiªcation of customary international law, but rather a relatively re-
cent departure from it.42
II. Shortcomings of International Law Regarding Piracy and 
Maritime Violence with Respect to Southeast Asia 
A. The Limits of UNCLOS 
 The deªnition of piracy contained in UNCLOS excludes many of 
the types of maritime attacks that currently occur in Southeast Asia.43 
In particular, UNCLOS requires that a crime occur on the high seas 
in order to be punishable as piracy.44 However, the majority of mari-
time attacks in Southeast Asia occur within a state’s territorial wa-
ters.45 Under UNCLOS, only the states in whose territorial waters the 
attacks occurred would be permitted to prosecute the offenders.46 
Assuming such a state is willing to act, its efforts would be limited by 
UNCLOS rules regarding “hot pursuit” as applied to Southeast Asia’s 
geography.47 UNCLOS provides that a state may commence pursuit of 
an offending ship within its territorial waters, and continue into in-
                                                                                                                      
39 See Rome Convention, supra note 37, art. 6. 
40 See id. 
41 See International Maritime Organization, Status of Conventions, at http:// 
www.imo.org/includes/blastDataOnly.asp/data_id%3D8068/status.xls (last visited Nov. 20, 
2004) [hereinafter Status of Conventions]. 
42 See Garmon, supra note 20, at 271. 
43 See, e.g., id. at 267 (noting how the UNCLOS deªnition is restricted to priacy taking 
place on the high seas and most incidents of piracy occur within territorial or port waters). 
44 See UNCLOS, supra note 26, art. 101. 
45 See International Maritime Organization, supra note 7, annex 2. 
46 Garmon, supra note 20, at 264; see UNCLOS, supra note 26, art. 101. 
47 See UNCLOS, supra note 26, art. 111. 
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ternational waters so long as the pursuit is uninterrupted.48 The right 
of hot pursuit ends, however, as soon as the ºeeing ship enters its own 
or a third state’s territorial waters.49 These limitations on the states’ 
ability to pursue offenders are especially problematic in insular 
Southeast Asia, where the islands of multiple countries are densely 
packed within relatively small areas.50 With little international water 
separating neighboring states, ºeeing ships can quickly escape into 
the territorial waters of another state and avoid capture and prosecu-
tion if the neighboring state is unwilling to act.51
 The requirement that an attack be motivated by private and ma-
terial ends further limits UNCLOS’ applicability to Southeast Asia.52 
Since UNCLOS excludes attacks that are politically motivated, it ex-
cludes acts of maritime terrorism that have become increasingly 
common in the region.53 Thus, maritime crimes committed by re-
gional dissidents, including kidnappings of crewmen to put pressure 
on regional governments and environmental attacks involving hi-
jacked oil tankers, are not punishable as piracy under UNCLOS.54
 The two-vessel requirement imposes a third limitation on the UN-
CLOS piracy provision’s usefulness.55 UNCLOS requires that perpetra-
tors stage an attack from one vessel against the crew or passengers of 
another vessel in order for the attack to qualify as piracy.56 Thus, an 
attack on a ship committed by its crew, its passengers, or stowaways 
likely would be excluded even though the social and economic harm 
would be identical to an attack that satisªed all of the UNCLOS ele-
ments.57
                                                                                                                      
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
50 See Zou Keyuan, Enforcing the Law of Piracy in the South China Sea, 31 J. Mar. L. & 
Com. 107, 111 (2000) (stating that most, if not all, of the South China Sea is located within 
the exclusive economic zone of one country or another). 
51 See id. 
52 See Garmon, supra note 20, at 265. 
53 See id. 
54 See id.; Economist, supra note 16, at 5. 
55 See Halberstam, supra note 32, at 287 (noting how a perpetrator of maritime vio-
lence could be caught on the high seas, have the motivation found to be for “private 
ends,” yet still fail to qualify as a pirate because he did not act from one ship against an-
other”). 
56 See UNCLOS, supra note 26, art. 101. 
57 See Halberstam, supra note 32, at 286–87. 
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B. The Limits of the Rome Convention 
 The Rome Convention was meant to ªll these gaps left by the 
UNCLOS deªnition of piracy.58 In particular, the Rome Convention 
covers acts occurring in territorial waters and acts motivated for po-
litical ends, as well as eliminating the two-vessel requirement.59 While 
the Rome Convention would empower Southeast Asian states to act 
more decisively in responding to maritime attacks, none of the states 
in Southeast Asia that are especially hard-hit by these attacks, namely 
the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia, have signed it.60
 The unwillingness of the region’s large insular states to join the 
Rome Convention can be explained in large part by the characteristic 
jealousy with which Southeast Asian states guard their political and 
territorial sovereignty.61 States in this region view the Rome Conven-
tion’s obligations concerning the extradition or prosecution of mari-
time criminals as an affront to their sovereignty because these provi-
sions prescribe how states should deal with matters concerning their 
own territorial waters.62 The unwillingness to participate in the Rome 
Convention deprives the states in Southeast Asia of an important legal 
framework for dealing with the acts of maritime violence that do not 
fall within the UNCLOS deªnition of piracy.63
 Even if the major insular states in Southeast Asia were to join to 
the Rome Convention, the Convention has shortcomings that prevent 
it from completely covering all the acts excluded by UNCLOS.64 Al-
though the Rome Convention’s deªnition of piracy covers attacks that 
do not fall within the UNCLOS deªnition, the Rome Convention’s 
provisions are only applicable within the jurisdictions of states party to 
it.65 Arguably, the scope of criminal attacks embraced by the Rome 
Convention’s deªnition of piracy includes acts that are not considered 
ergo omnes, and therefore do not provide for universal jurisdiction.66 
The acts within the Rome Convention’s deªnition of piracy are only 
punishable by the states that are party to the treaty, only if the perpetra-
                                                                                                                      
58 See Zou Keyuan, Part V: Piracy, Ship Hijacking and Armed Robbery in the Straits, 3 Sing. J. 
Int’l. & Comp. L. 524, 532 (1999). 
59 See id; Rome Convention, supra note 37, at art. 3. 
60 See Keyuan, supra note 58, at 532; Status of Conventions, supra note 41. 
61 See Young & Valencia, supra note 16 at 32. 
62 See id. 
63 See Keyuan, supra note 58, at 532. 
64 See Garmon, supra note 20, at 272–73. 
65 See id. 
66 See id. 
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tors or victims are nationals of a party state, and only if the offending 
acts take place in a party state’s territorial waters or the offending vessel 
was scheduled to navigate through such waters.67 Furthermore, the de-
cision by the parties to enforce the Rome Convention is ultimately dis-
cretionary.68 Even though a party may be obligated by the terms of the 
Rome Convention to act in response to an offense, the Convention 
does not provide for any sanctions against parties who fail to fulªll their 
treaty obligations.69 Thus, if a party authorized or obligated by the 
Rome Convention to act declines to do so, the purported attack may go 
unpunished and the other party states may have no recourse against 
that non-conforming state.70
 Thus, even if all relevant Southeast Asian states were to become 
party to the Rome Convention, the limitations of the Rome Conven-
tion and UNCLOS leave a regulatory gap through which certain acts 
of maritime violence could slip by unpunished.71 Terrorist acts occur-
ring on the high seas, for instance, would fall outside of both the 
UNCLOS and Rome Convention frameworks.72
III. Toward a More Historically Accurate Piracy Framework 
 Scholars have proposed two solutions to provide for more effec-
tive legal coverage of the forms of maritime violence that occur in 
Southeast Asia.73 First, as suggested by Tina Garmon, the UNCLOS 
deªnition could be revised to include acts motivated by political ob-
jectives.74 This expansion would provide for increased jurisdiction 
over maritime terrorism on the high seas and would allow UNCLOS 
and the Rome Convention to work together more cohesively, “extend-
ing a blanket of enforcement jurisdiction” over all types of maritime 
violence.75 However, Garmon’s proposal seemingly would be ineffec-
tive in Southeast Asia, where none of the major insular states are party 
                                                                                                                      
67 See id.; Rome Convention, supra note 37, art. 6. 
68 Garmon, supra note 20, at 273. 
69See Rome Convention, supra note 37, art. 16 (providing a forum for dispute resolu-
tion between parties regarding issues arising out of the interpretation or application of the 
Convention, but providing no speciªc sanctions). 
70 Garmon, supra note 20, at 273. 
71 Id. at 275. 
72 See id. 
73 See Garmon, supra note 20, at 275; Timothy H. Goodman, “Leaving the Corsair’s Name 
to Other Times:” How to Enforce the Law of Sea Piracy in the 21st Century Through Regional Inter-
national Agreements, 31 Case. W. Res. J. Int’l. L. 139, 158 (1999). 
74 See Garmon supra note 20, at 275. 
75 See id. 
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to the Rome Convention.76 Even if the UNCLOS party states were to 
agree to expand the deªnition of piracy to include politically moti-
vated acts, Southeast Asia’s lack of participation in the Rome Conven-
tion leaves many violent acts uncovered by the proposed deªnition.77 
For example, without the Rome Convention, Garmon’s expanded 
UNCLOS deªnition would not consider maritime attacks as “piracy” 
unless they occurred on the high seas or involved at least two vessels.78
 The second proposed solution suggests the use of regional trea-
ties to combat piracy and other forms of maritime violence.79 A re-
gional approach, as opposed to exclusive reliance on the broad-based 
UNCLOS, would allow smaller groups of states to create and enforce 
anti-piracy measures tailored to the unique situations of a given re-
gion.80 One example of a regional piracy initiative, suggested by 
Timothy Goodman, would designate joint patrol areas to coordinate 
the policing of the region’s waters by the signatories’ naval and police 
forces, and would employ uniform extradition procedures among the 
party states.81 A regional approach remains consistent with the pur-
poses of UNCLOS, which permits two or more parties to conclude 
agreements that modify its provisions (effective only as between those 
concluding parties) so long as the modiªcations are not incompatible 
with UNCLOS’ object and purpose, and do not affect the enjoyment 
of other parties’ rights or obligations under the convention.82 Fur-
thermore, regional agreements would make it easier to enforce the 
treaty obligations between the states.83 Although UNCLOS requires 
that states cooperate to the fullest extent possible in order to repress 
piracy, the large number of party states makes it difªcult to ensure 
that all states are meeting their obligations.84
 In Southeast Asia, however, the concept of regional cooperation 
has always been problematic.85 As mentioned previously, the South-
east Asian states generally guard their territorial and political sover-
                                                                                                                      
76 See Status of Conventions, supra note 41. 
77 See id; Garmon, supra note 20, at 275. 
78 See Garmon, supra note 20, at 275. 
79 See Goodman, supra note 73, at 156–57. 
80 See id. at 157–58. 
81 See id. at 159–60. 
82 Id. at 158. 
83 See id. at 156–57. 
84 Goodman, supra note 73, at 156–57. 
85 See Phillip Day, Security in a Straitjacket?: Why It’s So Hard to Make a Key Asian Waterway 
Safe from Terror, Wall St. J., June 13, 2002, at A5, available at 2003 WL-WSJ 3970564. 
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eignty with extreme jealousy.86 It is unlikely that Southeast Asian states 
would accept terms that would, for instance, allow neighboring naval 
forces to operate within their own territorial waters.87 As one ofªcial 
in Southeast Asia noted, “it would be very nice if [multilateral coop-
eration] could happen, but the issue of sovereignty in these countries 
[is] such that it won’t happen soon . . . [i]t’s a very, very sensitive is-
sue.”88 Indeed, the limited efforts at cooperation in combating piracy 
in the past have been colored by the preoccupation with sovereignty.89 
Southeast Asian countries have attempted joint patrols in the past, but 
their effectiveness has been limited by caveats preventing one state 
from operating in the territorial waters of another.90 Thus, although 
the states in the region, through the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN), have paid lip service to preventing maritime at-
tacks more effectively,91 and although news reports indicate that the 
ASEAN states are currently working towards implementing a new anti-
piracy pact, it remains uncertain whether such steps will lead to mean-
ingful cooperation that will effectively combat piracy in the region, or 
whether such measures will be largely diluted.92
 Rather than attempting to expand the UNCLOS deªnition or cre-
ate problematic regional agreements, the legal perspective from which 
states view the concept of piracy should be adjusted.93 As stated previ-
ously, the UNCLOS would exclude many of the maritime attacks in 
Southeast Asia from its concept of piracy.94 Nevertheless, these excluded 
attacks would inºict the same degree of damage on international trade, 
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which is the primary motivation for treating piracy as ergo omnes.95 Thus, 
the UNCLOS deªnition is too narrow to be considered the authoritative 
deªnition of piracy under customary international law.96
 The actual practice of states and the writings of jurists in past cen-
turies indicate that customary international law on piracy encom-
passed a broader scope of activity than the restrictive deªnition found 
in UNCLOS.97 When the international community ªrst attempted to 
codify international piracy law, no clear consensus as to the meaning 
of piracy could be derived from the writing of jurists or the practice of 
states.98 While many scholars supported the restrictive view of piracy 
ultimately adopted in UNCLOS, and while many acts considered to be 
piracy fell neatly within this deªnition, the actual practice of many 
states reºected a conception of piracy that covered a broad range of 
activities that had an adverse effect upon states’ maritime interests.99 
For example, the Norman Vikings in Western Europe and the Bar-
bary Corsairs of the Mediterranean were considered pirates, yet much 
of their activity took place on coasts and territorial waters.100 British 
authorities in the 19th century cited piracy law as a justiªcation to pur-
sue maritime bandits led by local nobility in the Malay Peninsula, even 
though the acts of banditry occurred within territorial waters and 
were politically motivated.101 English courts upheld this broad reading 
of piracy law, and held that “piracy is any armed violence at sea which 
is not a lawful act of war.”102 U.S. courts have also been willing to ap-
ply the law of piracy broadly.103 The U.S. Supreme Court has held that 
to bring an act within the scope of piracy it is not necessary for either 
actual plunder or an intent to plunder (i.e., a private end) to exist; if 
one “sinks or destroys an innocent merchant ship, without any other 
object than to gratify his lawless appetite for mischief,” it is as much 
an act of piracy as an act of robbery on the high seas.104 In 1937, dur-
ing the Spanish Civil War, nine states, including Bulgaria, Romania, 
and the USSR, treated acts of submarine warfare against merchant 
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ships as piracy, notwithstanding the fact that such attacks reºected no 
intent to rob and often took place in territorial waters.105 The wide 
range of activity treated as piracy indicates a conception of piracy un-
der customary international law that was broader and more ºexible 
than the deªnition established by UNCLOS.106 Historically, states rec-
ognized that a wide variety of activity could cause the type of harm 
that justiªed treating piracy as a universal crime.107
 Thus, given the ºexible manner in which piracy law has been ap-
plied previous to its adoption, UNCLOS should not be seen as having 
codiªed existing international law.108 Rather, UNCLOS presented a 
signiªcant departure from what the international community ac-
cepted as piracy.109 As such, UNCLOS would be binding upon the 
countries that signed it, but would not reºect the customary interna-
tional law binding upon the international community as a whole.110 
While it is true that the provisions of a treaty can gradually gain such 
wide acceptance that they become part of customary international 
law, 111 the fact that UNCLOS only gathered enough signatures to en-
ter into force in 1994 weighs against such an argument in this case.112
 Thus, certain crimes that do not fall within UNCLOS should still 
be considered piracy.113 Southeast Asian states should be able to 
prosecute acts of maritime terrorism that would not otherwise satisfy 
the requirements of the UNCLOS framework, and those states could 
justify their actions by citing to the long existing customary practices 
of other states.114 Given such legal authority, the actions of Southeast 
Asian states taken against piracy would not be dependent upon their 
participation in any treaty, as all states may rely upon customary in-
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ternational law when responding to attacks that threaten their mari-
time interests.115
 Southeast Asian states can respond to more incidents of maritime 
violence through reference to pre-UNCLOS customary international 
law than is currently possible relying solely upon UNCLOS as a legal 
basis.116 Given the concerns for piracy’s effect upon both international 
trade in Southeast Asia and the possible link between pirates and 
Southeast Asian terrorist groups, the international community would 
likely embrace a broader construction of international piracy law.117
Conclusion 
 Maritime piracy remains a serious concern in Southeast Asia due 
to its threat to international commerce and human safety. Further-
more, the possible link between piracy and the numerous terrorist 
groups operating in Southeast Asia has placed even greater attention 
on piracy’s threat to the security of the region. International agree-
ments that deal with piracy and other acts of maritime violence, such as 
UNCLOS and the Rome Convention, seem inadequate as a legal basis 
to protect the region from such acts. The deªnition of piracy found in 
UNCLOS is too narrow and does not encompass many acts that regu-
larly occur in Southeast Asian waters. The lack of participation in the 
Rome Convention by the insular states in Southeast Asia makes the 
agreement virtually inapplicable in that region. The solution to the lack 
of coverage provided by these international agreements may lie in the 
customary law on piracy that existed prior to UNCLOS. The deªnition 
of criminal piracy, as evidenced by the historical practice and jurispru-
dence of states, was broader than the deªnition adopted by UNCLOS. 
As such, UNCLOS, which only entered into force in 1994, did not cod-
ify existing law, and acts of maritime violence that do not fall within 
UNCLOS may nonetheless constitute piracy. Thus, states in Southeast 
Asia may have a legal basis for prosecuting acts such as maritime terror-
ism as piracy, even though the same acts would not fall under the 
deªnition of piracy adopted by UNCLOS. Given the scope of interna-
tional concerns over Southeast Asian piracy, it is likely that the interna-
tional community would support the revival and readoption of the cus-
tomary deªnition of piracy prior to UNCLOS. 
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